Prospective participants should apply online by filling in the electronic form in http://www.cemfi.es/summer_school_uimp/home.asp
This Summer School will provide an introduction on current corporate governance issues from an economic, financial, and legal perspective. The focus will be on issues associated with external financing of firms, managerial discretion, and small investor protection. The following topics will be dealt with in depth:
1. How to reconcile equal treatment of shareholders with adequate compensation for value-enhancing interventions?
2. Who monitors the monitor?
3. How to deal with the problem of potential collusion between management (the agent) and the delegated monitor (block-holder, auditor, director, underwriter, rating agency, analysts, etc.)?
The aim of the Summer School is both to develop the general principles of corporate governance, and to provide a comparative institutional perspective of corporate governance arrangements across countries. The lectures will also be based on several case studies.
The Summer School is intended for doctoral and post-doctoral students in economics and finance. Participation is compulsory for Early Stage Researchers of the European Corporate Governance Training Network (ECGTN).
The Summer School is structured as follows. In the morning sessions the faculty will give a set of lectures based on their forthcoming book Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy. In afternoon sessions, the participants will have the opportunity to present their own research and discuss it with the faculty and other participants. In addition, there will be time for broader discussions and exchange of ideas, which may on occasions even lead to new joint research projects.
REFERENCES
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa A. Rà¶ell (2002), "Corporate Governance and Control," ECGI - Finance Working Paper No. 02/2002.
Marco Becht, Patrick Bolton, and Ailsa A. Rà¶ell (2008), Corporate Governance: Theory, Evidence and Policy, Clarendon Lectures in Economics, Oxford University Press.
Jean Tirole (2006), The Theory of Corporate Finance, Princeton University Press.
FACULTY
Marco Becht is a Professor of Finance and Economics at Université Libre de Bruxelles, Executive Director of the European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI), and Scientist in Charge of the European Corporate Governance Training Network (ECGTN). He holds a PhD in Economics from the European University Institute, and an MSc and BSc in Economics from the London School of Economics. He has previously held positions at Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI) and the European Commission´s Directorate for Industry. He has been a member of the Policy Committee of the European Confederation of Directors´ Associations and Scientific Adviser of the Committee on Corporate Governance of the European Association of Securities Dealers. His current research interests are in the areas of takeovers, shareholder activism, and corporate governance and control.
Patrick Bolton is David Zalaznick Professor of Business at Columbia Business School. He received his PhD from the London School of Economics in 1986 and holds a BA in Economics from the University of Cambridge and a BA in Political Science from the Institut d´Etudes Politiques de Paris. He began his career at the University of California at Berkeley and then moved to Harvard University. Subsequently, he has been at Ecole Polytechnique, London School of Economics, Université Libre de Bruxelles, and Princeton University. His research is in the areas of contract theory, corporate finance, and industrial organization. A central focus of his work is on the allocation of control and decision rights to contracting parties when long-term contracts are incomplete. This issue is relevant in many different areas including: the firm´s choice of optimal debt structure, corporate governance and the firm´s optimal ownership structure, vertical integration, and constitution design. His work in industrial organization focuses on antitrust economics and the potential anticompetitive effects of various contracting practices.
Ailsa Roell is Professor of International and Public Affairs at Columbia University. She holds a PhD in Political Economy from Johns Hopkins University and an MSc in Economics from the University of Groningen. She has previously held positions at the London School of Economics, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Tilburg University, and Princeton University. .Her research interests are in the area of financial economics, with special reference to securities markets, corporate finance, and corporate governance. She has published extensively in the area of stock market microstructure, with empirical and theoretical papers on market trading architecture and its impact on liquidity and price formation. Her latest work has focused on corporate governance, ranging from historical work on concentration of control, shareholder rights and takeover defense mechanisms in the Netherlands to an empirical analysis of compensation, earnings manipulation, and class action litigation in the USA.
APPLICATION
The Summer School is intended for doctoral and post-doctoral researchers in economics, finance, and law. Participation is compulsory for Early Stage Researchers of the European Corporate Governance Training Network (ECGTN).
The number of participants will not exceed 30. Admission decisions will be made by the Director on the basis of the applicants´ educational background and research interests.
Prospective participants should apply online by filling in the electronic form in
Applicants should briefly describe their research, and upload a pdf file with their curriculum vitae. Those who wish to present their research in an afternoon session should also upload their paper (or extended abstract).
The deadline for application is 30 May 2008.
Patrocinadores: Centro de Estudios Monetarios y Financieros (CEMFI)
European Corporate Governance Training Network (ECGTN)
Colaborador: Comisión Nacional del Mercado de Valores (CNMV)
